Ram Orzach specializes in the area of asymmetric information and itsâ€™ influence on decision making. When private information is held by a decision maker and he has to choose an action that the market observes and responds to, it is considered a signaling game. Ram works on signaling games concerning advertising and entrepreneurship. When the private information is held by more than one decision maker, it is considered a multi-sender game. Ram works on a model in which incumbent firms are facing competition from potential entrants. Models in which the decision makers hold different information are called differential information. He uses these methods to understand the behavior of buyers and sellers in auctions. Recent work introduces these methods to Law and Economics. His work is published in the RAND Journal of Economics, Games & Economic Behavior, International Economic Review, Journal of Mathematical Economics, and the International Journal of Game Theory.
Microeconomics, Industrial Organization, Game Theory, Auctions, Law & Economics
Models of Incomplete Information in: Signaling Games, Auctions, Law & Economics